Condition: New. The death of Jacques Derrida in represented a major interruption in contemporary intellectual life. This death calls for an engagement with Derrida's work and an attempt. Seller Inventory More information about this seller Contact this seller 2. This death calls for an engagement with Derrida's work and an attempt to understand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
More information about this seller Contact this seller 3. Published by Edinburgh University Press. About this Item: Edinburgh University Press.
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- Jacques Derrida: Selected full-text books and articles.
- Jacques Derrida.
Explores the implications of Derrida's death for the future of critical thought itself; includes chapters which engage with contemporary themes within Politics and International Studies, Philosophy, Literary Studies and Postcolonial Studies. Num Pages: pages.
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Key Features: The first interdisciplinary text of its kind Features original work from some of the world's most eminent Derridean scholars including Richard Beardsworth, Christina Howells and Christopher Norris Includes chapters which explore the relationship between Derrida and key contemporaries such as Sartre, Nancy, Heidegger, Blanchot, Deleuze, Levinas and Habermas. Available format s :. Student Filter. Remove Student. Get Reading. Follow these steps to start your student with reading our audiobooks. Not one plus one thatresults in two ones alike; but with the other and others who no longer or no t yet are andwhose absence makes one 'one' of a longer series, two, three, etc.
So thepossibility of the sentence 'I am', of the perfect example of the grammatico- temporalassertion of present is displaced through the haunting by the past. The future also comes into play, as wehave mentioned in the previous section, as this ghost does not let itself be caught by theclaims of present.
It has to have a possibility of returning. Becaus e it counts with the other who is not presentable, it cannot finish such a counting,and it must, in th e now amply rehearsed terminology of Derrida, remain venir tocome. According to him, this reliance upon living as surviving which in turn brings forththe ha unting at the very centre of any attempt of onto- temporal assertion of is wouldmark a possibility of resistance to the formula of responsibility and justice and hencenecessarily politics that may only answer to the claims of is, as: no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born.
No justice  seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghost of those who are not yet born or who are already dead. Or, put differently, by underscoring howthe act of living in terms of surviving involves being- with those who are not present, Derrida demonstrated that thetime of the political cannot abide to any single, proper moment determined in terms ofpresent presence, but must happen in time which cannot be equal to itself, in time that isout of joint.
And as such, the categories of the political that simultaneously takes place inand overflows the present must count on the non-present and non- presence as well. Infact, the possibility of meaning of these categories is given precisely through t his initialwith before any formulation or association has yet taken place, in the very moment onev entures to say 'I' or 'we'.see
Derrida : negotiating the legacy
Where there is one, there is always more than one The second relation, the one involving the other and the death of the other, is conditionedby the co uple life- death and equally marks the act of living. While this point comes afterthe preceding one, it would be absurd to consider it as subordinate. In summarising the similar lexicon they bo th share, the act of living is already a living- with which reveals how the notion of 'one' as the only one the political can begin countingwith, is problematic.
Again, it appears, living as an act of 'one' who may say 'I am' is notpossible without t he counting on the other 'I am with' which again makes impossiblethe notion of justice and responsibility in terms of given symmetry.
As we shall see, theother defines my living as a living- with, and I am from the beginning placed in thestructure of responsibility and relation to the other. This issue of the death of the otherarises in conjuncture with the idea of learning to live here we could add to learn to livejustly, rightly or politically.
In other words, it concerns the act of living as an act andthis involves death; it involves being more than one where one is no longer one. As we cannot get out of reach of the relation life death and the dead himself, we have todetour our argument and start off with life. It is in Derrida's major work, Specters ofMarx, that opens with a discussion about learning how to live, that Derrid a argues thatliving as an act is not possible with the reliance upon the notion of life alone.
Life, he maintains, must learn from something else than itself: To live is, by definition, not something one learns.
Not from oneself. It is not learned from life, taught by life. Only from the other and by death. In any case from the other at the edge of life. At the internal border or the external border, it is a heterodidactics between life and death If it learning to live remains to be done, it can happen only between life and death. Neither in life nor in death alone. Or rather, the signature of death in thiscontext se ems to be inscribed into the name of living itself. From the very beginning, then,my own relation t o life, indeed, my relation to myself as myself, is established through thisstructure marked by deat h.
I begin living only by surviving as I learn to live only throughdeath. To learn to live cannot be r eliant upon any notion of life-in- itself, but must relyupon the other: 'From the other and by death from the other at the edge of li fe'. Out ofthe first part of this quote we gather that only the other can teach me how to live, how to perform the act in which I am already performing living. But then, who is at the edge oflife? The other at the threshold of his death, or the other at t he edge of my life, where thereis no more 'I' or 'one'? From the edge, the other teaches me how to live, engaged from thebeginning in this act, which, it appears, can never be only mine, as it involv es the other.
Iflearning how to live involves death, then the only death which can make possible m ylearning to live is that of the other. While this death can never be appropriated it is theother's singularity it is the first and the only death I can possibly have a relation to. So inthis regard, my relation to t he other must begin with my possibility of surviving him.
Butsurviving here requires to live with t he death of the other rather than negating theexistence and the being of the other. By being the only relation to deaththat I have, the other in that sense bears my death. To further engage with one's relation to the death of the other, let us pursue with theanalysis of Bl anchot's text, The Moment of My Death, Derrida recounts a dialogue: One of the two, One of the Two says to the Other 'I am alive', and would thus be the one who has survived.
But it is the other, the one who has survived, who responds to him: 'No you are dead'. And this is a colloquium, this is the dialogue between two witnesses who are moreover [au demeurant] the same, alive and dead, living-dead, and both of whom in abidance [en demeurance] claim or allege that one is alive, the other dead, as if life went only to an I and death to a you. The possibility of surviving begins withthe inclus ion of the other, hence it must always happen with the other.
This is not to saythat one and the oth er are the same, one of the two alike: that would be re- introducing the idea of symmetry andexemplarity as the original condition. Instead, precisely beca use they are not the same,because the death of the other separates him from me, this act of survivi ng becomessignificant and begins to operate with the notion of time and political categories ofresp onsibility and justice that avoid the rule of is. My presence in terms of 'I am' is, inBlanchot's word s, 'only presence at a distance, and this distance is absolute that is,irreducible; that is, infinite'.
The in finity and the absolute alterity of the other is precisely what inducesdissymmetry and the impossib ility of closure into the notion of living qua surviving andinto the idea of 'one- self' or 'I'. To the extent that the other is included into my act of livingthrough his death and henc e my death , which renders my living living-with, then thisliving- with is always with something infinite, something that does not give itself to adefinition, conceptu alisation or ontologisation.
In the centre of the 'I' or 'one', as we havealready rehearsed, there is the n something that resists the grounding of this one, and givesthe possibility for one another.
In Bla nchot's words: What calls me most radically into question? Not my relation to myself as finite or as the consciousness of being before death or for death, but my presence in the proximity of another who by dying removes himself definitively, to take upon myself another's death as the only death that concerns me, this is what puts me beside myself, this is the only separation that can open me, in its very impossibility, to the Openness of a community. Because it happens between life and death, survivaldoes not happen so lely to the 'one' of the two, but always involves more than one.